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Abstract
This paper explores a model of bond prices where agents have diverse prior beliefs about domestic and
foreign inﬂation. In the long run, the foreign exchange forward premium reﬂects expected differences in
inﬂation, but in the short run, it depends upon the diversity of prior beliefs. If some people have diffuse
priors about a country’s inﬂation process, then its currency commands a forward premium that is eventu
ally dissipated. Using data on the dollaremark premium from the 1980s, it shows that this kind of diver
sity really matters. Thus models with a single representative agent give an inadequate description of the
data.
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1. Introduction
This paper takes the idea of heterogeneity in ﬁnancial markets seriously. It develops a theory
of the foreign exchange forward premium based upon the notion that people in the world econ
omy have diverse prior beliefs about inﬂation. For most plausible speciﬁcations of prior beliefs,
agents eventually have completely accurate knowledge about each country’s inﬂation

processes. Indeed, in the long run, yields reﬂect the common inﬂation forecasts, and the for
ward premium predicts expected depreciation of the spot rate accurately. Thus the asymptotic
behavior of the world economy can be modeled using the artiﬁce of a single ‘‘representative
agent’’ having ‘‘rational expectations’’ about all the ‘‘fundamentals’’ in the world economy.
But in the short run a fascinating theory of asset prices emerges. This theory has two impor
tant elements. First, the learning matters. Interest differentials depend upon the stochastic inﬂa
tion history in the world economy, and the model provides a simple explanation for the
‘‘forward discount anomaly.’’1 Second, the heterogeneity of beliefs matters. In this paper, I
will show that it is not enough to ask traders what their inﬂation forecasts are; it is actually
necessary to ask them how sure they are of their own forecasts. Because different classes of
agents can hold more or less precise forecasts, bond yields typically have an option value in
herent in them, even if everyone agrees on expected inﬂation. An asset is worth the sum of
its expected real stream of income and the option value of reselling it at a later date. This option
value can never be negative, and it is typically positive. Thus yields are lower than they would
be if the world economy consisted of a single representative agent.
Whether this effect is stronger for domestic or foreign assets is at the heart of the theory. One
implication is that diverse precision of beliefs about a country’s inﬂation process will raise the
price of its bonds and thus lower their yields. Hence there will be a forward premium for that
currency. An important insight is that all the moments characterizing agents’ beliefs matter.
Thus it is not appropriate to consider only each person’s point forecasts of expected inﬂation;
it matters how precise these forecasts are.
How does a theory of asset prices emerge in a model where people have diverse prior be
liefs? In particular, one question arises immediately: Why is this model not plagued by Mil
grom and Stokey’s (1982) No Trade Theorem? The answer lies in the subtle distinction
between an environment in which agents have common priors but diverse ex post signals
and one in which everyone has different priors but observes the same signals.
Consider, for example, the 500th digit in the decimal representation of e. A speaker walks
into the seminar room and offers a contract that pays $1 if that digit is 5. I may believe that it is
likely to be an even number, and you may have more diffuse beliefs. We could easily announce
our priors (thus establishing common knowledge), and we would both agree that you would pay
more for the contract than I would.2 Then the speaker opens a laptop and begins to read off
numbers from the Taylor series expansion: 1.0, 2.0, 2.5, 2.67, and so on. After each new num
ber, the speaker allows us to trade. It is quite possible that you and I would be willing to do so,
with perhaps especially active trading once we get near the n-th term, where n! z 10501. Thus
the existence of a market (with limited short selling) where agents have heterogeneous priors is
completely consistent with equilibrium.
Now think of a similar situation, but the speaker announces that he is willing to sell for $1
a contract that pays $1000 if the 500th digit in the decimal expansion of e is not 5. He then takes
out his laptop and boots up. No matter what your priors were, you would be unwilling to buy
that asset precisely because the speaker has shown he has received a superior signal about its
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See Engel (1996) for a good discussion.
Of course, I might want to short that contract to the greatest extent possible, but we would both agree that some limit
on my position is warranted because I have limited wealth. Likewise, you might like to go arbitrarily long, but your
position too will be ﬁnite in practice. It will become apparent below that a limited short-selling assumption is necessary
for equilibrium to exist in this kind of market.
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value. Now differential information destroys the very existence of equilibrium. What is the es
sence of the difference between the two examples? In the ﬁrst case, all the priors are common
knowledge and so are all the public signals. But in the second case, even if the prior beliefs are
common knowledge, the signals are not.
The model developed in Section 3 is akin to the ﬁrst example. The analysis builds upon the
work of Harrison and Kreps (1978), who showed that the asset’s price typically exceeded the
valuation of the most bullish trader. They stated that this was a formalization of Keynes’s notion
of a beauty contest. Morris (1996) extended this work to incorporate learning in a Bayesian
framework, and Fisher (2003) extended his model to explain asset bubbles that arose in the for
eign exchange experiments reported in Fisher and Kelly (2000).
This paper makes four contributions. First, it applies Morris’s (1996) work by building
a model of bonds and extends it by incorporating more general stochastic processes. Second,
it is a completely novel analysis of the foreign exchange forward premium. To the best of
my knowledge, no one has built or calibrated a model like this in international ﬁnance. Third,
the model’s calibration and estimation shows that plausible priors can explain some of the for
ward premium for the German mark during the ﬁrst half of the 1980s. That period and that cur
rency were chosen to complement Lewis (1989) impressive empirical analysis using Bayesian
techniques of a reduced form model of the exchange rate. Fourth, I actually estimate the pre
cision with which different classes of agents hold plausible prior beliefs; then I show that there
is strong evidence in favor of a model with diversity of beliefs. The typical homogeneous agent
model in macroeconomics is just not supported by the data.
What are this paper’s main results? First, it shows that diverse prior beliefs about a country’s
inﬂation process induce a forward premium for its currency at horizons greater than one month.
Second, it shows that the ‘‘peso problem’’ is not as simple as has been assumed; indeed, the
typical interpretation of this phenomenon imposes very severe restrictions on agents’ beliefs.
Third, it gives a simple explanation for a strong version of the forward discount anomaly.
When there is diverse prior information about a country’s inﬂation process, its one-month for
ward rate will be negatively correlated with realized depreciations. Fourth, the model is cali
brated and then estimated using actual data from the United States and Germany during the
1980s. The model performs well enough, although the effect of informational heterogeneity
on the forward premium is not large. The calibrations of the model outperform a simple bench
mark based upon covered interest parity, and they show that diversity of prior beliefs improves
the model’s ﬁt. Fifth, I use a non-linear regression to test for homogeneity of beliefs in the data,
and the Wald test overwhelmingly rejects the workhorse model in international ﬁnance. Diver
sity of beliefs really matters in these data.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a simple but extended example
because the model is strikingly different from the norm in international ﬁnance. Section 3 con
tains a formal description of the model, and Section 4 discusses the forward premium both
when there is one representative agent and when there are several agents in the world economy.
Section 5 calibrates and then estimates the model for plausible speciﬁcation of the agents’ prior
beliefs. It also shows that the models’ predictions give rise to the forward premium anomaly.
Section 6 gives some brief conclusions.
2. A simple example
Consider two zero-coupon bonds maturing in two years, one denominated in dollars, the
other in euros, and each with a face value of 100. These two bonds are identical in every

Table 1
Conjugate priors

Type 1 agents
Type 2 agents

Prior beliefs about American inﬂation

Prior beliefs about European inﬂation

a ¼ 100; b ¼ 100
a ¼ 100; b ¼ 100

a ¼ 100; b ¼ 100
a ¼ 0:01; b ¼ 0:01

waydwith respect to risk, liquidity, and other relevant factorsdbut differ solely in their cur
rency of denomination. American inﬂation can take on one of the two values: 0% or 8%. Eu
ropean inﬂation can assume the same two values. Thus the inﬂation rate in either country is
a binomial random variable. To make things very simple, we will slow down economic time
and assume that information relevant to inﬂation forecasts arrives only once a year.
There are two classes of agents in the world economy, and each has unbiased beliefs about
domestic and foreign inﬂation rates. Everyone is risk neutral and has very precise beliefs about
American inﬂation. But one class of agents has much less precise beliefs about European in
ﬂation. Table 1 summarizes the relevant priors.3
A Type 2 agent is essentially a frequentist about European monetary policy: his posterior
beliefs will reﬂect the history of European inﬂation almost exactly.
Agents discount felicity with the common factor d ¼ 0.97 z 1/1.03. Since they are risk neu
tral and may hold different beliefs, it is natural to impose that there is limited short selling and
to assume that there is sufﬁcient liquidity in the market to price the current stock of assets. Let
b(s, t) be the price of a dollar bond when there have been s years of high American inﬂation
during the ﬁrst t years; the notation b*(s, t) is analogous for the instrument denominated in
euros. These bonds can be priced using backward induction.
Consider the dollar-denominated asset. In the second year, if inﬂation in the United States
was low in the ﬁrst year, then everyone’s posterior beliefs are such that:
bð0; 1Þ ¼ d½ð101=201Þ100 þ ð100=201Þð100=1:08Þ�z93:42:
On the other hand, if there has been high inﬂation in the United States, then:
bð1; 1Þ ¼ d½ð100=201Þ100 þ ð101=201Þð100=1:08Þ�z93:39:
This slightly lower price and higher yield reﬂect higher expected American inﬂation. Thus both
classes of agents will agree at the null history that the dollar bond will cost:
bð0; 0Þ ¼ d½ð1=2Þbð0; 1Þ þ ð1=2Þbð1; 1Þ=1:08�z87:25:
Pricing the euro bond is not quite as simple. If there has been low European inﬂation in pe
riod 1, then Type 2 agents will be bullish about European inﬂation and will hold all the eurodenominated assets. Thus:
b� ð0; 1Þ ¼ d½ð1:01=1:02Þ100 þ ð0:01=1:02Þð100=1:08Þ�z96:93:

3
DeGroot (1970, p. 40) shows that the natural family of conjugate priors is the beta distribution. This distribution has
two parameters a > 0 and b > 0, and its density function is f ðxÞ ¼ ½Gða þ bÞ=GðaÞGðbÞ�xa�1 ð1 � xÞb�1 if 0 < x < 1
and f ðxÞ ¼ 0 otherwise, where GðaÞ is the gamma function. The mean of this random variable is a=ða þ bÞ; and its
variance is ab=ða þ bÞ2 ða þ b þ 1Þ.

But if there has been high inﬂation in Europe, then only Type 1 of agents will hold the Euro
pean bonds, and they will pay:
b� ð1; 1Þ ¼ d½ð100=201Þ100 þ ð101=201Þð100=1:08Þ�z93:39:
Thus at the null history everyone will agree that the initial price of euro bonds is:
b� ð0; 0Þ ¼ d2 ½ð1=2Þb� ð0; 1Þ þ ð1=2Þb� ð1; 1Þ=1:08�z88:95:
The initial yield on European bonds is lower than that in American, even though at the null
history everyone in the world economy expects that the American and European inﬂation rates
will be identical. The euro trades at a premium because some agents have less precise beliefs
about European inﬂation than others.
Of course, the difference between American and European yields is the two-year forward
premium on the euro. Now let f (s,s*;T � t) be the T � t year forward premium when there
have been s years of high American inﬂation and s* years of high European inﬂation during
the ﬁrst t years of a pair of bonds that mature in year T. A simple approximation shows that
the two-year euro forward premium at the null history is:
f ð0; 0; 2Þzðln 0:9454 � ln 0:9273Þ=2z0:97%
per annum. The euro trades two years forward at a premium simply because the market has
more diverse beliefs about European inﬂation. Still, the difference between the yields on
one-year dollar and euro bonds at the null history would be:
f ð0; 0; 1Þ ¼ 0:0%;
since everyone expects the same inﬂation rate for America and Europe.
For simplicity, impose that purchasing power parity holds after any history, and thus the
nominal depreciation of the dollar reﬂects the realized inﬂation differential. Assume further
that the realizations of American and European inﬂation are described by independent binomial
random variables with equi-probable outcomes.4 Then, at the null history, the one-year forward
rate is an unbiased predictor of the expected depreciation. Still, at long horizons, the forward
discount is a biased predictor of exchange rate changes even though all agents are risk neutral.
The remarkable aspect of this example is that everyone has unbiased inﬂation expectations for
every country and there is no expected inﬂation differential. But there is a premium on eurodenominated assets simply because some agents have less precise beliefs about the future
path of European inﬂation. Thus the long euro trades at a premium since the option value of
reselling European bonds is not negligible.
Let me conclude this extended example by mentioning an important fact that is true in
a much more general framework. The forward premium arises in a ﬁnancial model with ‘‘cli
entele effects.’’ In particular, some assets are held by only a subset of the agents after some
histories. There would be no option value to holding a bond denominated in any currency if
everyone always held the same portfolio all the time.
4

If every agent has unbiased beliefs, we are implicitly imposing the equilibrium condition that a ¼ b.

3. The model
This section shows how this example generalizes. Assume again that all the agents in world
ﬁnancial markets are risk neutral. It is possible to allow each person to discount streams of fu
ture utility at the idiosyncratic rate di. A bond dominated in domestic currency has par value V,
matures in T � 1 month, and pays semi-annual coupons c/2, all denominated in units of the do
mestic currency. Even though these are ‘‘risk-free’’ assets, they are claims to nominal streams
of income and thus are subject to inﬂation risk. Foreign bonds of the same maturity have par
value V* and pay an analogous coupon of c*/2, both denominated in foreign currency.
The domestic inﬂation rate is an independent and identically distributed stochastic process
~ be a random variable with support P ¼ fp1 ; .; pk g, qj be the prob
with ﬁnite support. Let p
~ occurs, and q ¼ ðq1 ; .; qk Þ. It is appropriate to think of each
ability that the j-th realization of p
period as a month, the highest frequency at which relevant price
are generally
available.
 data

�
�
�
�
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The random variable for foreign inﬂation
p
,
its
support
P
¼
p
;
.;
p
� , and the concom
1
k

itant probabilities q� ¼ q�1 ; .; qk�� are all analogous.
World ﬁnancial markets consist of several different classes of agents. The representative
agent from each class has idiosyncratic priors about the inﬂation processes in each of the
two countries. Let Dk be the relevant simplex; then the measurable function ri : Dk /½0; 1� de
notes the i-th agent’s prior beliefs about the inﬂation rates of the domestic country and
�
r�i : Dk /½0; 1� represents that person’s prior beliefs about inﬂation in the foreign country.
The assumption that there are different classes of agents allows one to analyze price-taking equi
libria, but since the agents may have different priors about world inﬂation processes, there may be
no equilibrium unless a limited short-selling constraint is imposed. This is perhaps not an unreal
istic assumption about actual ﬁnancial markets, but it has profound implications for the nature of
the equilibrium in this model. The descriptions of inﬂation and beliefs arequite general.



~1; p
~ �1 ; .; p
~t; p
~ �t
The inﬂation proﬁles in each country are the relevant history. Thus ht ¼ p
0
is a history of length 0 � t � T. Now let nðht Þ ¼ ðn1 ðht Þ; .; nk ðht ÞÞ be a vector denoting the
number of times each different level of domestic inﬂation has been observed in history ht.
t
sufﬁcient
statistic for estimating the home inﬂation process and
Of course,
 �nðht Þ is the
0
� t
n ðh Þ ¼ n1 ðhÞ; .; n�k� ðht Þ is analogous
for the foreign inﬂation.5 The null histories are


0
such that n h0 ¼ ð0; .; 0Þ and n� h0 ¼ ð0; .; 0Þ0 .
An agent’s posteriors about the process driving domestic inﬂation are:
4i ðqjht Þ ¼ R

ðq1 Þn1 /ðqk Þnk ri ðqÞ
:
ðx1 Þn1 /ðxk Þnk ri ðxÞdx

Likewise, the i-th agent’s posterior beliefs about foreign inﬂation are:
4�i ðq� jht Þ

 � n�1  � n�� � �
q
/ qk� k ri ðq Þ
¼ R 1 n�
:
n�
ðx1 Þ 1 /ðxk Þ k� r�i ðxÞdx

Both integrals are taken over the relevant simplexes. In essence, these posteriors represent the
agent’s model of the inﬂation process, given the common history that everyone has observed. If
5
These statistics are sufﬁcient only because I have assumed that the inﬂation processes are i.i.d. In reality, inﬂation is
obviously quite persistent. This will be a major foible in the model’s empirical implementation.

the priors are well behaved, these posteriors converge to the true processes, but the speed of
convergence depends upon the precision of initial beliefs.
Deﬁne an indicator function



pj if x ¼ 0; .; qj ; .; 0
zðxÞ ¼
:
0 otherwise
Then a representative agent’s forecast of expected domestic inﬂation is:
ZZ
 i ðht Þ ¼
4i ðqjht ÞzðxÞdq dx:
p
Likewise, a typical forecast of foreign inﬂation is:
ZZ
� t
 i ðh Þ ¼
4�i ðq� jht Þz� ðxÞdq� dx;
p
where all the variables and the indicator function are analogous. In each of these formulas, the
inner integral is taken with respect to a person’s prior beliefs and the outer integral is taken with
respect to realized inﬂation rates. Thus this model allows for a natural generalization of ex
pected inﬂation where agents have heterogeneous priors about the mechanics of monetary
policy.
Let the pricing kernel g : Dk /Rþ have the rule
 



b n1 ; .; nj þ 1; .; nk if x ¼ 0; .; qj ; .; 0
gðxÞ ¼
;
0
otherwise


where b n1; .;nj þ 1; .; nk is the price of a domestic bond when the successor to history ht
has n htþ1 ¼ n1 ðht Þ; .; nj ðht Þ þ 1; .; nk ðht Þ . Then the price of a domestic bond satisﬁes
the recursion:
 ZZ

4i ðqjht Þ½c=12 þ gðxÞ�
t
bðh Þ ¼ maxi di
dq dx ;
1 þ zðxÞ
where c=12 captures the fact that a pro-rated share of the semi-annual coupon is paid implicitly
each month. The price of a foreign bond likewise satisﬁes:

 ZZ � � t �
4i ðq jh Þ½c =12 þ g� ðxÞ� �
� t
b ðh Þ ¼ maxi di
dq dx :
1 þ z� ðxÞ
These recursive formulae are at the crux of the model of the forward premium. They state
a bond sells for what that most bullish class of agents will pay for it. This price is the expected
present value of the pro-rated coupon and capital gains. But each agent’s expectations depend
upon prior beliefs about the relevant country’s inﬂation process.
After history ht, the T � t forward discount on domestic currency is given by the difference
between home and foreign yields. Thus
f ðht ; T � tÞ ¼ ðb� ðht Þ=bðht ÞÞ

1=ðT�tÞ

is the forward discount in percent per annum for a contract maturing at T.

A simple description of the spot exchange rate closes
 the model. Let the domestic and for
eign price levels atQ
the null history be p(h0) ¼ 1Qand p� h0 ¼
 1; for any other history, the price
~ s Þ and p� ðht Þ ¼ ts¼1 1 þ p
~ s� . Imposing heroically that the real
levels are pðht Þ ¼ ts¼1 ð1 þ p
exchange is constant,6 we see that the spot exchange rate is:
eðht Þ ¼ pðht Þ=p� ðht Þ:
This deﬁnition follows the American convention: the exchange rate is denominated in units
of domestic currency per unit of foreign exchange. Since domestic and foreign inﬂation pro
cesses are independent multinomial random variables, the log of the spot exchange rate has
a unit root. This model of the spot rate is unrealistic in the extreme, having little to recommend
it other than analytical simplicity. Still, the actual rate of depreciation reﬂects the historical in
ﬂation differential, and purchasing power parity holds identically in every period.
4. The behavior of the forward premium
The forward premium will depend in general upon all the prior beliefs and the stochastic real
izations of the inﬂation proﬁles in the world economy. If ri ð$Þ and r�i ð$Þ are well behaved for
every agent, then the posteriors will converge to the true inﬂation processes. Thus, after a sufﬁ
ciently long history, the forward premium at any horizon will eventually reﬂect the expected in
ﬂation differential.7 Since all the posterior beliefs converge to the true inﬂation proﬁles, it is
appropriate to speak of ‘‘the inﬂation differential,’’ and the most patient classes of agents will
set the prices of domestic and foreign bonds. Then covered interest parity will insure that the
expected depreciation of the domestic currency reﬂects the domestic inﬂation differential.
During the early periods, the forward premium is determined by the conﬁguration of priors
and by the (stochastic) initial realizations of the inﬂation. In general, the forward rate is not
a Martingale. The easiest way to see this is to note that each agent’s valuation of any bond de
pends upon both his priors and the history of inﬂation in both countries. The expected value of
any stream of incomedand thus the forward rate at all horizonsdis not independent of history.
Hence the spot exchange rate and the forward premium will be correlated in the early periods.
A general description of the forward premium is quite involved, and it is appropriate to consider
two separate cases. I will ﬁrst analyze the case with one representative agent in the world econ
omy. Then I will discuss the general case with several agents.
4.1. One representative agent
Consider the situation in which one agent has prior beliefs rðqÞ and r� ðq� Þ about the pro
cesses driving domestic and foreign inﬂation. There is no reason to require these beliefs to
be unbiased, and there are no simple restrictions that might be imposed upon their correlation.
Assume that the representative agent has the same subjective expected inﬂation for the domes
tic and foreign central banks. Then, abstracting from Siegel’s paradox, expected depreciation will
be zero since both domestic and foreign bonds will be discounted identically. Still, the early his
tory of inﬂation will have a strong effect on the forward premium, especially if either rðqÞ or
6
This assumption is not idle; it is the only way of ensuring that a risk-neutral agent is indifferent between holding
domestic and foreign bonds after any history.
7
Still, the bond pricing formulae exhibit Siegel’s (1972) paradox.

r� ðq� Þ are diffuse. For example, if there is an initial (random) spell of low inﬂation in the home
country, the domestic yields will drop and foreign exchange will trade forward at a discount. Since
yields reﬂect expected inﬂation, early realizations of the inﬂation process are doubly important for
bonds with a long horizon. First, they occur when the agent’s beliefs have the least precision. Sec
ond, the movements in the price of long bonds are ampliﬁed since their time to maturity is distant.
Thus the forward premium at long horizons will be quite volatile initially.
What if the subjective probabilities are biased? Then the country with the higher subjective
expected inﬂation has a bond that trades at a steep discount and a correspondingly high yield.
Hence that country’s currency will trade at a forward discount. In the long run, the actual real
izations of the inﬂation rate will reﬂect the true underlying monetary process. The econometri
cian will observe a secular change in the forward premium that is not justiﬁed by the actual
historical inﬂation differential. If the original priors are quite diffuse, then the period of learning
will be fairly rapid, and the forward premium will forecast the actual rate of depreciation of the
spot exchange rate after only a short time. But if the (incorrect) prior beliefs about either coun
try have a high degree of precision, then the econometrician would see a very long period dur
ing which the forward premium was a biased predictor of changes in the spot rate.
4.2. Several types of agents
If there are several heterogeneous agents in the world economy, then a fascinating theory of
asset prices emerges. First, all of the elements of learning are still present. Second, the hetero
geneity of beliefs also matters. In particular, the price of a bond now reﬂects both the subjective
expected present value of its cash ﬂow and the option value of reselling it after some future
history. Hence a currency will trade at a forward premium if there is a wide diversity of opinion
about that country’s inﬂation process. Since foreign exchange is traded forward at one month,
three months, six months, and a year, this option value is highest for forward rates at longer
horizons. Also, the one-month forward rate will not include a component having to do with
the heterogeneity of beliefs.
It is easiest to illustrate these ideas by imposing in the rest of this subsection that agents have
conjugate prior beliefs about the actual inﬂation and have identical subjective discount factors.
Assume
priors described by Dirichlet distributions with parameters
 that agent i has conjugate
8
�
�
; .; ai;k
ai ¼ ai;1 ; .; ai;k and a�i ¼ ðai;1
� Þ. Again, P is the vector of possible domestic inﬂa
tion rates and P* be analogous. Then this person’s expectations about domestic and foreign
inﬂation at the null history are:
 
   0
�
 i h0 ¼ ðai Þ0 P=ai;0 and p
 i� h0 ¼ ai� P� =ai;0
p
;
Pk
�
where
Pk� a�i;0 ¼ j¼1 ai;j measures the precision of his beliefs about domestic inﬂation and ai;0 ¼
j¼1 ai;j is analogous. This person’s posteriors induce these inﬂation forecasts:
0

0
 �i ðht Þ ¼ a�i þ n� ðht Þ P� =ða�i;0 þ tÞ:
 i ðht Þ ¼ ðai þ nðht ÞÞ P=ðai;0 þ tÞ and p
p

8
See DeGroot (1970), p. 174. This distribution is the natural conjugate for the multinomial, and it is a generalization
of the beta distribution. The i-th agent
that the
probability
of the k-th event is ai;k =ai;0 , and he believes that


 believes
2 prior
ai;0 ai;0 þ 1 . If ai;0 z0, then this agent has non-informative priors.
the variance of this outcome is ai;k ai;0 � ai;k

The ﬁrst important fact is that if all the agents’ priors have the same precision, then the agent
who is initially most bullish about a country’s inﬂation prospects will always be so. This agent
will always hold that country’s bonds, and there will be no option value inherent in
bonds
  denominated in its currency at long horizons. Here’s why. Let i be such that
 i h0 ¼ minj fa0j P=aj;0 g. Since all the priors about domestic inﬂation have the same precision,
p
we may put ai;0 ¼ a0 . But then
0

 i ðht Þ ¼ ðai þ nðht ÞÞ P=ða0 þ tÞ:
p
Hence the ranking of the agents’ expected inﬂation forecasts does not change since they all ob
serve the same history. Then a simple argument using backward induction from any terminal history
shows that this agent will pay the most for the bond denominated in the domestic currency. Of
course, the same is true for the class of agents that is most bullish about foreign inﬂation, even though
the relevant precision about that process may be different. Thus no bond price will have any option
value inherent in it, and the forward rate at any horizon will reﬂect a simple learning process.
This observation has important implications for the forward premium. Only when agents’
prior beliefs are of different precision will a bond have a lower yield than that forecast by
the most bullish group in the world economy.9 In other words, the higher moments of the priors
matter in a model with limited short selling, an illustration of Morris’s (1996) switching con
dition for this model. Thus, if people in the world economy have unbiased but heterogeneous
beliefs about a country’s inﬂation prospects, then its bonds will have a relatively low yield, and
its currency will trade forward at a premium.
Now consider the polar case where at least two agents’ prior beliefs have different
precision

 and there
 i h0 ¼ p
but all the agents have the same initial forecasts for domestic inﬂation. Thus p
is a class of agents with the least precise beliefs; let these priors have precision ai,0. Likewise, the
agents with the most precise beliefs have priors with precision aj;0 > ai;0 . A second important
fact is that only these two classes of agents will ever hold the domestic bond, and there is a simple
way of describing who holds these bonds when. The agents with the most precise priors hold do
 . In other words, the
mestic bonds if and only if the history has been such that P0 nðht Þ=t > p
agents with the most precise prior beliefs hold domestic bonds when average domestic inﬂation
has been high, and those with the least precise beliefs hold them when it has been low.
Here’s why this fact is true. One can always write the posteriors as:


t P0 nðht Þ=t

ai;0 p
t
 i ðh Þ ¼
p
þ
:
ai;0 þ t
ai;0 þ t
Thus anyone’s posterior beliefs are a weighted average of the common prior expected inﬂation and
the commonly observed average history of domestic inﬂation. Now consider the partial derivative:
0

 i ðht Þ=vai;0 ¼ t
vp

 � nðht Þ P=t
p
ðai0 þ tÞ

2

:

9
A colleague’s comments helped me hammer this point home more forcefully. Imagine testing my ideas using survey
data on inﬂation expectations. It is not enough to calculate the dispersion of point forecasts among different classes of
traders. Instead, it is necessary to get data on how sure each agent was about his or her forecast. Since inﬂation surveys
typically do not collect this kind of information, one must make a strong statistical assumption linking dispersion of
forecasts among agents with the degree to which some of them felt that their subjective beliefs were imprecise.

 � nðht Þ0 P=t > 0. In other words, when in
Thus this posterior is increasing if and only if p
ﬂation has been low, the agents with the least precise beliefs are most bullish about domestic
bonds; otherwise the agents with the most precise beliefs are most bullish. An implication
  is
,
 i h0 ¼ p
that even if average inﬂation converges in probability toward the common prior p
there will almost surely be trade in domestic bonds after any ﬁnite horizon.
This discussion provides a simple explanation of the ‘‘forward premium anomaly.’’ If
agents have heterogeneous beliefs, then the forward premium will depend upon the stochastic
history of the world economydeven when everyone has unbiased priors about the inﬂation
differential and expected movements in the spot exchange rate. Consider the simple case
when the foreign inﬂation process is known and thus everyone has perfectly precise and un
biased prior beliefs about foreign inﬂation. Assume also that there are two types of agents
with unbiased beliefs about domestic inﬂation; one group has very precise priors and the other
has imprecise ones. At the null history, everyone expects the spot exchange rate to depreciate
according to the common expected inﬂation differential. After a history of high home inﬂa
tion, only people with precise priors would hold home bonds. Thus short-term interest
ratesdbased upon asset prices for which the option value of eventual resale is negligi
bledwould still reﬂect the actual expected inﬂation differential, and the one-period forward
premium would not be correlated with future depreciations. But after a history of low home
inﬂation, the agents with imprecise priors hold domestic bonds and the interest differential
would be lower than the actual expected inﬂation differential. Thus the one-period forward
premium would indicate an expected appreciation that would not happen on average. Hence
there is a negative correlation between actual depreciations and the one-period forward
premium.
Thus there is an ineluctable interaction between each agent’s expectations about the inﬂation
processes and the degrees of precision that characterize his beliefs. Also, the volatility of the
forward premium depends upon the precision of these prior beliefs. When there is less preci
sion, there is greater volatility of bond prices and a larger reaction of the forward premium
at long horizons. This premium will exhibit conditional heteroscedasticity since periods of
high volatility are bunched together as agents are learning about the true inﬂation processes
in the initial periods of the world economy.
The volatility of the forward premium will also be higher if there are diffuse priors about
a bond that has low coupon payments. Since such a bond has a relatively long duration, small
changes in expected inﬂation have large effects on yields. Thus the forward premium will move
signiﬁcantly with the advent of news relevant to forecasting inﬂation.
This model of the forward premium also has important implications for the ‘‘peso problem,’’
ﬁrst described in an analytical framework by Krasker (1980). When will a country’s currency
trade at a forward discount for a sustained period, even if the econometrician has observed no
large depreciation of the spot rate? One obvious possibility is that agents anticipate a large de
valuation that occurs with a small probability; in this model, that notion corresponds to an el
ement in the support of a country’s inﬂation process that is very large but which may have small
weight. But it is obvious that the ‘‘peso problem’’ endures only when all classes of agents have
high precision about a small probability event, an unlikely situation indeed. Instead, it is quite
plausible that people have diffuse priors about the monetary policy of a central bank undertak
ing a new regime of price stabilization. This diversity of beliefs would tend to keep the forward
currency strong, and learning would tend to undercut any initial fear of hyperinﬂation. Thus the
forward discount reﬂects both the lack of conﬁdence in the inﬂation reduction scheme and the
degree of conformity in traders’ beliefs.

5. The model and the data
This section accomplishes three goals. First, it describes the data from an important period in
recent monetary history during which the dollar traded forward at a discount, even though it
continued to appreciate on the spot market for almost ﬁve years. Second, it shows in detail
how the model was calibrated. To the best of my knowledge, this is one of the ﬁrst attempts
at calibrating a model in which the diversity of prior beliefs has substantial empirical bite.
Third, it actually estimates the model in two different ways and shows that diversity of prior
beliefs may well characterize the data. Again, I believe this is the ﬁrst time that an economic
model in macroeconomics or ﬁnance with heterogeneous beliefs has been estimated and then
tested.10
5.1. Data on the dollaremark forward premium and the relevant inﬂation rates
Fig. 1 presents monthly data on the mark forward premium at different horizons during the
ﬁrst half of the 1980s. This was a period during which it was common for the dollar to trade
forward at a discount, although there was a continued appreciation of the dollar until after the
Plaza Accord in September 1985. This episode of international monetary history gave rise to
a large literature on the foreign exchange risk premium. Two facts are salient. First, the dollar
was trading forward at a discount during this entire period. Second, the actual change in the
spot exchange rate was an order of magnitude larger than the forward premium, and the forward
premium was the wrong sign during most of this period. Two other facts are worth emphasiz
ing. First, the forward premia at different horizons are highly correlated. Second, all the premia
were much more volatile at the beginning of this period, when Paul Volcker became chair of the
Federal Reserve Board, than at the end, when a successful disinﬂation had been undertaken.
The next step is to gather data on the actual inﬂation rates of Germany and the United States
during those ﬁve years.11 The median rates of consumer price inﬂation, calculated from the 60
annualized monthly changes, were 3.2% in Germany and 3.8% in the United States. The data
generating processes for these time series presumably have continuous support, but the model is
analytical and computationally tractable only for a multinomial distribution. Indeed, the model
implies that all the moments of the processes describing beliefs about inﬂation matter, and I had
to make a choice about how best to model the inﬂation processes using multinomial
10
Using proprietary survey data, Elliott and Ito (1999) demonstrate that there is a diversity of beliefs in these markets.
But they do not estimate an economic model where diversity matters. Chavas (2000) studies the U.S. beef market and
shows that a signiﬁcant fraction of suppliers have na€ıve expectations about price formation, but he did not develop
a full-ﬂedged model of informational heterogeneity. In his own vocabulary, traders ‘‘within each information group’’
are rational, but they are implicitly blissfully unaware of the forecasters of other types of suppliers. Baak (1999) studies
the same market and uses a different econometric technique to estimate the fraction of ‘‘boundedly rational’’ agents.
Again, this model of a market is not really fully speciﬁed because it lacks an explicit description of what constitutes
common knowledge among all agents.
11
I used the BLS series for all urban consumers (all items) not seasonally adjusted for American prices. The data on
German prices are completely analogous, and they come from the Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland. The spot ex
change rate and forward premium were given to me in private correspondence by Nelson Mark. They were originally
weekly data, and I chose the ﬁrst week of each month to constitute the relevant monthly data. The interested reader will
ﬁnd all the data used in this paper at http://economics.sbs.ohio-state.edu/eﬁsher/Dollar_Mark_Historical.xls. They span
the period was from March 1973 (the beginning of the modern era of ﬂoating exchange rates) through December 1985
(three months after the Plaza Accord).
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Fig. 1. The data (January 1981eDecember 1985).

distributions with discrete supports. Truth in advertising dictates that I should emphasize again
that the assumption of independently and identically distributed data generating processes is
probably at least as problematic as assuming discrete supports. The correlation between current
inﬂation and inﬂation in near months has serious implications for the efﬁciency of the Method
of Simulated Moments estimator.
Table 2 shows a tractable histogram describing the distributions of the actual inﬂation rates.
These data were used in the simulations.
Why did I choose histograms with ﬁve bins? One needs a model with at least three bins to
have independent measures of the ﬁrst two moments of the inﬂation process, and I though that
higher moments also might matter. In brief, I classiﬁed the actual inﬂation histories for the two
countries using these discrete data.12 Even with this simple structure for domestic and foreign
inﬂation, there are 4368 possible histories during the 12 months before a one-year forward con
tract matures.13 The simulations are computationally complex, although feasible on a personal
computer with a Pentium chip.
It is worth emphasizing that nowhere did I use the data on the spot exchange rate in calibrat
ing the model. Indeed, I am trying to build and evaluate a model of the forward premium, not
one of the spot market where purchasing power parity is imposed after every possible history. I
am thankful for this small mercy!

12
There is a practical problem lurking in these discrete supports. The support for the American inﬂation process is
more dispersed than that for German inﬂation. The model indicates that forward premia will depend upon inﬂation ex
pectations along all possible histories, even those not realized in the data. Thus Siegel’s paradox will tend to make dol
lar-denominated bonds more valuable, especially at long horizons. The implied American yields will be lower than
would if the two inﬂation processes had identical discrete supports.
13
The degree of computational complexity becomes especially daunting for the Method of Simulated Moments esti
mators. In that case, I used 50 random histories and a numerical algorithm that searches through a two-dimensional
parameter space; an iteration takes around 10 min on a fast laptop, and the algorithm converges in around 6 h from
an initial starting value for the parameters.

Table 2
Discrete distributions of consumer price inﬂation, 1981 through 1985
Germany

United States

Support (%)

Frequency (%)

Support (%)

Frequency (%)

�4
0
4
9
12

2
10
70
15
3

�5
0
5
11
14

2
8
67
18
5

5.2. How to simulate the model
Since the model has predictions for the forward premium at each horizon, I have 240 pieces
of data that I am trying to ﬁt with a parsimonious parameterization. The theory in Section 4
indicates that a model with only two classes of agents is already quite interesting, and consid
erations of scientiﬁc elegance and computational tractability led me to impose that restriction.
When both agents have identical priors, the simulation captures the typical representative agent
assumption in ﬁnance, albeit with an element of Bayesian learning. When the agents have dif
ferent priors, the heterogeneity of beliefs is important, and measuring this effect is my primary
empirical contribution.
Here are the broad strokes of how to simulate the model. Each simulation begins by spec
ifying both agents’ prior beliefs about the American and German inﬂation processes. In keeping
with the spirit of Bayesian analysis, these beliefs need not even be proper distributions; indeed,
any ﬁve non-negative numbers has an interpretation as a Dirichlet distribution with a certain
precision. Then, sequentially for each of the 60 periods in the data, dollar-denominated bonds
and mark-denominated bonds are priced, feeding the program the actual realizations of the (dis
crete) inﬂation processes as the ﬁve-year history after December 1980 unfolds. Of course, all
four prior distributions are updated appropriately using the actual history. Each agent has his
own subjective valuation of American and German yields, and the model prices American
and German bonds after every history, using the relevant subjective evaluations about all pos
sible future histories until the bonds mature. Finally, each simulation spits out the dollar pre
mium at the relevant four horizons in every period as the actual history unfolds. The
simulations all impose that the discount factor for each class of agents is 0.97 and that domestic
and foreign assets are both zero-coupon bonds.
5.3. Method of Simulated Moments estimation
The model with two representative agents has 22 parameters: each agent has ﬁve parameters
that describe prior beliefs about the American inﬂation process, ﬁve others that characterize the
German inﬂation processes, and a subjective discount factor. The model is a complicated map
ping from these parameters to predictions about the data.
It is appropriate to keep the estimation of the model as simple as possible, for reasons of both
analytical elegance and empirical tractability. First, I imposed that the two agents had identical
discount factors d1 ¼ d2 ¼ 0:97; it is notoriously difﬁcult to estimate these parameters accurately,
and I am already conducting an unorthodox empirical analysis. Second, I examined only two
kinds of prior beliefs. Table 3 summarizes the non-sample restrictions that I have imposed.

Table 3
Non-sample information and estimated parameters

Discount factor

First class of agents

Second class of agents

d1 ¼ 0:97

d2 ¼ 0:97

Case of strongly rational expectations
Beliefs about American inﬂation a1 ¼ b1 � ð0:02; 0:08; 0:67; 0:18; 0:05Þ0
Beliefs about German inﬂation
a�1 ¼ b3 � ð0:02; 0:1; 0:7; 0:15; 0:03Þ0

a2 ¼ b2 � ð0:02; 0:08; 0:67; 0:18; 0:05Þ0
a�2 ¼ b4 � ð0:02; 0:1; 0:7; 0:15; 0:03Þ0

Case of Bayesian adaptive expectations
Beliefs about American inﬂation a1 ¼ b1 � ð0; 0:05; 0:365; 0:365; 0:22Þ#
Beliefs about German inﬂation
a�1 ¼ b3 � ð0:02; 0:23; 0:47; 0:2; 0:08Þ0

a2 ¼ b2 � ð0; 0:05; 0:365; 0:365; 0:22Þ0
a�2 ¼ b4 � ð0:02; 0:23; 0:47; 0:2; 0:08Þ0

Two separate cases were estimated by the Method of Simulated Moments. First, I imposed
strongly rational expectations about the actual German and American inﬂation processes; this is
a very strong form of rational expectations because it assumes that the agents know the entire
histograms of these processes, except for a multiplicative constant that is interpreted as the
precision of the prior belief. Thus one class of agents was given this prior for American
inﬂation a1 ¼ ð0:02; 0:08; 0:67; 0:18; 0:05Þ0 and this prior for German inﬂation
a�1 ¼ ð0:02; 0:1; 0:7; 0:15; 0:03Þ0 . These priors correspond to the actual historical inﬂation pro
cesses that occurred from January 1981 through December 1985, and both have unitary preci
sion.14 Imposing that the other class of agents had the same priors up to a multiplicative
constant, I used the Method of Simulated Moments to estimate the two free precision param
eters. In sum, I am imposing that b1 ¼ b3 ¼ 1 and then estimating b2 and b4 in the top half of
Table 3. In the second case, agents had ‘‘adaptive expectations’’; their prior beliefs were based
upon inﬂation histories during the 93 previous months from March 1973 to December 1980, the
entire modern era of ﬂoating exchange rates. Hence in this second case, one class of agents was
given these priors for American inﬂation a1 ¼ 93 � ð0; 0:05; 0:365; 0:365; 0:22Þ0 and these pri
ors about German inﬂation a�1 ¼ 93 � ð0:02; 0:23; 0:47; 0:2; 0:08Þ0 . The second class of agents
had the same beliefs, but I again estimated two free precision parameters. Now I am imposing
that b1 ¼ b3 ¼ 93 and then estimating b2 and b4 in the bottom half of Table 3.
What is a good benchmark against which to judge the model? The simplest model of the
forward rate imposes covered interest parity. Then the Fisher equation and the assumption of
real interest rates equalization imply that:


f ðht ; T � tÞ ¼ E pT � p�T ht ;
where E½pT jht � is the expected (annualized) domestic inﬂation rate between
 t and T. This ex
pectation is taken with respect to the history ht, and the expectation E p�T ht is analogous
for the foreign country. Imposing that realized ex post inﬂation is the proper proxy for expected
inﬂation, Fig. 2 graphs these simple predictions. The benchmark prediction at a one-month ho
rizon is more volatile than that at 12 months because monthly price changes can be quite
variable.
14
The reader is reminded that beliefs with a precision of 1 are very diffuse. Indeed the ﬁrst monthly observation is
given as much weight as the prior beliefs. On the other hand, beliefs of precision 100 imply that the entire history
of 60 months is not more important than the priors brought to the market.
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Fig. 2. Simple predictions (January 1981eDecember 1985).


0
What is a simple measure of a model’s goodness of ﬁt? Let y ¼ y10 ; y20 ; y30 ; y40 be the
stacked vector of the 240 observations on the forward premium at the four different horizons
0
for the ﬁve years under consideration, and let ^y ¼ ðy^10 ; ^y20 ; ^y03 ; ^y40 Þ be the corresponding predicted
values. If one estimates k parameters, then the adjusted R2 is an adequate summary measure.
This statistic gives equal weights to forecasts at each horizon. Its value for the benchmark modeld
in which no parameter is estimateddis 0.22; thus actual ex post inﬂation explains very little of
the variation in the actual forward premium, a fact that should be of no surprise to the empir
ically oriented reader.
Table 4 gives the estimates and model-ﬁt statistics from the Method of Simulated Moments.
The Appendix gives my exact technique. Since the computation is very time consuming, I could
only estimate two parameters. Because the Quasi-Newton numerical algorithm used for mini
mization searches over all of two-dimensional real space, I estimated the model in logarithms.
That transformation makes sense of negative estimates of the precision parameters.
Four facts in Table 4 are worth emphasizing. First, even with only two free parameters, the
model performs much better than the benchmark; this is not much of a surprise since covered
interest parity is a real straw man. Second, imposing adaptive expectationsdthose based upon
recent historydﬁts the data better than imposing strongly rational expectations. Third, there is
some very weak evidence that the heterogeneity of prior beliefs does seem to matter. Fourth, the
model’s two parameters are estimated very imprecisely, probably because there is much corre
lation in the inﬂation data and the numerical techniques for estimating the relevant gradients are
very imprecise in a model that is so highly non-linear. I conclude this subsection by reiterating
Table 4
Method of Simulated Moments estimates, exponential transformation (standard errors are in parentheses)

b1
^2
b
^3
b
^4
b
Adjusted R2

Strongly rational expectations

Bayesian adaptive expectations

b1 h0
�18.6 (5.6 � 107)
b3 h0
14.7 (4.3 � 106)
0.59

b1 hlnð93Þ
24.2 (1.2 � 108)
b3 hlnð93Þ
�10.1 (2.1 � 104)
0.81

Table 5
Non-linear least squares estimates, exponential transformation (corrected asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses)
^0
b
^1
b
^2
b
^3
b
^4
b
Sum of squared errors
Wald test for homogeneity of beliefs (the
critical value is 9.21 for a test of size 1%.)

Strongly rational expectations

Bayesian adaptive expectations

�3.33 (0.0017)
�9.93 (19.0)
�9.42 (0.0027)
�7.27 (0.00011)
�23.7 (0.00081)
0.053
4.41 � 108

�3.40 (0.0018)
0.678 (1.43)
�5.964 (0.0405)
�1.83 (0.055)
0.885 (0.587)
0.041
39.44

that a plausible model of the forward premium can be calibrated and then estimated, and it ﬁts
the data at least as well as the usual benchmark. There is weak preliminary evidence that the
diversity of prior beliefs does indeed matter.
5.4. Non-linear regressions
Since the model is a complicated mapping from the parameters to predictions about the data,
it is entirely appropriate to consider a non-linear regression. Let
yt ¼ f ðxt ; bÞ þ ut
be such a speciﬁcation. Here yt is the forward premium, xt includes the history of inﬂation that
is in the information set for the relevant forward premium, and b is a vector of parameters to be
estimated. The interpretation of the error term ut is twofold. First, the discrete inﬂation processes
impose aggregation errors. Second, a parsimonious parameterization will inevitably leave out
some important factors that do indeed explain the forward premium.
Thus my second group of regressions estimates the following model
yt ¼ b0 þ f ðxt ; b1 ; b2 ; b3 ; b4 Þ þ ut ;
where a constant has been included to make sure that the error terms have the proper location
and where the other four parameters are the precision of the prior beliefs of a class of agents
about the American and German inﬂation processes. The Appendix describes the exact method
I used for the non-linear estimation.15
Table 5 reports the estimates, their standard errors, and the Wald statistics based upon the
null hypothesis of homogeneous prior beliefs. Several comments are in order. First, these esti
mates are much better than those based upon the Method of Simulated Moments. This is true in
part because the econometric model includes a constant term. This term is estimated quite ac
curately; the forward premium was roughly expð�3:33Þ ¼ 3:58% in the rational expectations
case and expð�3:25Þ ¼ 3:88% in the adaptive expectations case. Second, the estimated
15
Starting from a random initial condition, I used Gauss’s Quasi-Newton minimization routine to minimize the sum of
squared errors. The objective function is ﬂat in a neighborhood of non-linear least squares estimates, and the model is
identiﬁed only up to two symmetric classes of beliefs. I ran the program repeatedly until I was satisﬁed that I was in
a neighborhood of a global minimum. Since the precision of anyone’s belief has to be a non-negative number, I actually
estimate the model in logarithms.
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Fig. 3. Model predictions with strongly rational expectations (January 1981eDecember 1985).

coefﬁcients show that a model of learning for all agents matters in both cases because none of
the estimated coefﬁcients is very large. The highest estimate of a precision parameter is for the
ﬁrst class of agents in the adaptive expectations case. One class believed that American inﬂa
tion of the late 1970s was going to persist, but they did so only with a precision
expð0:885Þ ¼ 2:42. The meaning of this number is that one class of agents took around two
and a half months to start to give signiﬁcant weight to the in-sample data about inﬂation real
izations. Third, the model based upon adaptive expectations does better than the one based
upon strongly rational expectations. Thus the data have strong evidence in favor of the notion
that the inﬂation history of the 1970s inﬂuenced beliefs in 1981.16
Figs. 3 and 4 show the model’s predictions. Let me concentrate on Fig. 3 ﬁrst; this is the
model with strongly rational expectations. There are two salient characteristics of these pre
dicted values. First, the initial periods show a very large forward premium. Second, after
a while, the model predicts essentially a constant forward premium. The implication is that
the diversity of prior beliefs matters the most in the initial periods; these are the periods during
which the assets will trade back and forth between the different classes of agents. It is worth
exploring the actual inﬂation history of 1981 to show why the model predicts a change in di
rection after September 1981. The ﬁrst nine months of the U.S. inﬂation history have eight
events in the 11% bin and one in the 14% bin. The 10th event falls in the 5% bin, and this
causes investors to begin to change beliefs about American inﬂation radically. The 23rd month
of the data also marks a milestone, and this is where there are twice as many events in the 0%
bin (four) as in the 14% bin (two). Thus the model seems to indicate that the market learned that
the Volcker disinﬂation was credible in December 1982. After this, the diversity of beliefs does
not seem to matter.

16
I performed a Cox test for non-nested models. Using the null that the model with strongly rational expectations is
true, I can resoundingly reject the estimates from the model with adaptive expectations. Under the alternative, I equally
strongly reject the estimates from the model with strongly rational expectations. These two rejections are not surprising,
since it is likely that the true model involves more than two classes of agents.
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Fig. 4. Model predictions with Bayesian adaptive expectations (January 1981eDecember 1985).

Fig. 4 tells a similar story; this ﬁgure captures the predictions from the model with Bayesian
adaptive expectations. The initial months in which the dollar traded forwarded at a discount re
ﬂect the inertial effects of higher inﬂation in the United States in the 1970s. The change in the
forward premium after the summer of 1981 corresponds to the ﬁrst realization of German inﬂa
tion that falls in the 4% bin; in the ﬁrst few months of 1981, there had been fairly signiﬁcant
German inﬂation. After that event, the heterogeneity of beliefs does not seem to matter much.
Let me conclude this subsection with a brief summary. This is the ﬁrst time that any economic
model with diverse prior beliefs has been brought to the data. There is evidence in favor of two
salient facts: (1) learning matters for a proper model of the forward premium; and (2) a model
with one homogeneous agent misses an important element of the data. The diversity of prior
beliefs matters most in the early periods of the model; this makes a lot of sense because sooner
or later the actual data will overwhelm any sensible prior beliefs that are brought into a new
inﬂation regime. This is the fundamental empirical contribution of my work.
5.5. The model and the forward premium anomaly
The empirical discussion so far has avoided the obvious question: Do the predictions also ex
hibit the forward premium anomaly? In one sense, this query is a straw man because the model
imposes the Procrustean requirement that the spot exchange rate satisfy purchasing power parity
in every period. Still, there are good theoretical reasons for which the anomaly will arise in this
model. Table 6 shows output from the regressions based upon the typical speciﬁcation:
ðetþ1 � et Þ ¼ g0 þ g1 ð ft � et Þ þ utþ1 ;
Table 6
Forward premium anomaly in the model’s predictions (t-statistics values are in parentheses)

Strongly rational expectations case
Bayesian adaptive expectations case

^0
g

^1
g

0.001 (0.92)
0.0005 (0.25)

�0.004 (�31.4)
0.014 (�25.9)

where all variables are in logarithms, etþ1 � et is the depreciation of the spot exchange rate
ft � et is the model’s predicted one-period forward premium, and utþ1 is an error term not in
the information set at time t. The numbers in parentheses in that table are the t-statistics based
upon the null hypotheses that g0 ¼ 0 and g1 ¼ 1. The standard NeweyeWest correction has
been applied to this regression, and I used a lag of 13. There is overwhelming evidence that
these calibrations exhibit the forward premium anomaly, although the estimates of g1 are
not as negative as in some other studies.
The main reason that the model’s predictions show the forward premium anomaly is that,
after about a year, the predicted forward premium becomes largely stable. Thus a high inﬂation
realization doesn’t move the forward premium very much, but it does cause a depreciation of
the spot exchange rate because of the model’s strong assumption about a constant real exchange
rate. Hence there is little correlation between realizations of the spot exchange rate and the for
ward premium. Since the way the spot exchange rate is modeled is so artiﬁcial, I do not attach
much importance to the fact that the estimated model exhibits the anomaly.
6. Conclusions
This paper has developed a new theory of the forward premium based upon a model that
takes heterogeneity in ﬁnancial markets seriously. The model has striking predictions for the
forward premium; it shows that diverse beliefs about a country’s inﬂation process make its cur
rency trade forward at a premium in contracts whose horizons are greater than one month. The
calibration of the model is perhaps plausible, but it predicts perhaps too much learning. Still,
the notion that agents had diverse beliefs about monetary policy and doubted that inﬂation
could be abated at the beginning of the 1981 is indeed intuitive.
My primary empirical contribution is that I actually estimate the precision with which dif
ferent classes of agents in the world economy held plausible prior beliefs. There is evidence in
these data that a model with one agent is just not an accurate description of world asset markets.
This is the ﬁrst time that an extension of the elegant models based upon Harrison and Kreps
(1978) and Morris (1996) has been taken to the data, and my work shows that these authors
were quite right to worry about diversity of beliefs in ﬁnancial markets.
The model has many weaknesses. First and foremost, it is ludicrous to impose that the real
exchange rate is constant. My only defense is that a good model of the spot exchange rate is left
to those with superior analytical powers. Another important weakness is that the model assumes
that inﬂation process in each country is independently and identically distributed. Inﬂation is
obviously correlated between countries and across time, but this fact is difﬁcult to incorporate
into an analytically tractable model with Bayesian learning. The calibrations and estimates are
suggestive but not exhaustive. Again, my defense is that there is no other study in international
ﬁnance that takes a structural model with heterogeneous priors and Bayesian learning to the
data. So this empirical work is just a ﬁrst step.
In an important sense, my model is a better description of term structure than it is of the
forward premium.17 Most empirical analyses of the yield curve show that the expectations hy
pothesis of the term structure is not true; the spreads between certain long rates and short rates
do not predict future short rates. Rudebusch (1995) argues that the monetary authority’s policy
distorts bond prices at the short end of the yield curve. My model offers an alternative avenue
17

This paragraph was inspired by a referee’s comments.

worthy of exploration; future researchers can analyze the effect of heterogeneity of beliefs on
the yield curve in a national bond market.
Perhaps this paper will spur other researchers in international ﬁnance to investigate models
with heterogeneous beliefs. It is remarkable that the ‘‘forward discount anomaly’’ can be ex
plained so easily in a model with risk-neutral agents. It is essential that we economists be care
ful in our interpretations of the notion of rational expectations as an equilibrium concept.
Models with heterogeneous prior beliefs are more general than the usual ones with one repre
sentative agent. The equilibria described in this paper all converge to the ‘‘rational expectations
equilibrium’’ if agents’ priors are well behaved. And the typical model used in international
ﬁnance is a special case of the one that has been explored; after all, one can always impose
that everyone’s perfectly precise priors agreed with the actual distribution of inﬂation. But in
formational heterogeneity and limited short selling surely characterize actual ﬁnancial markets.
So it would be nice to continue building models that incorporate these obvious facts.
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Appendix
Here is how I constructed the Method of Simulated Moments estimators. I used the fact that
the order of the inﬂation events in a Bayesian model should not matter since I have assumed the
natural conjugate priors. Hence, any history that satisﬁes the ﬁnal empirical distribution of in
ﬂation events in Germany and the United States was equally likely. (Again, I am relying heavily
on the assumption of independent inﬂation events in each month!) So I drew 50 such random
h60 ð1Þ; .; ~h60 ð50Þg, each element consisting of an entire ﬁve-year history
ﬁve-year histories f~
of inﬂation for the two countries.
Then I essentially followed the technique given in Davidson and Mackinnon (2004, chapter
9.6). Let b ¼ ðb2 ; b4 Þ0 be the vector of precisions to be estimated from Table 3, and let y
240�1

be the appropriately stacked vector of data on the forward premia. It is convenient to write
z as the vector of squared values of these data. For a given vector of parameters
240�1

b ¼ ðb2 ; b4 Þ#, each simulated history s ˛f1; .; 50g gives predictions for these data
^y ðb; sÞ and their squared values ^z ðb; sÞ. Let
240�1

240�1

my ðbÞ ¼ ð1=50Þ

50
X

^y ðb; sÞ and mz ðbÞ ¼ ð1=50Þ

s¼1 240�1

50
X
s¼1

^z ðb; sÞ

240�1

be the predicted moments for a given vector of parameters. Now consider the natural weighting
matrix w ¼ I2 5 i and the quadratic form
240�1

QðbÞ ¼

y � my ðbÞ
z � mz ðbÞ

T

w

y � my ðbÞ
:
z � mz ðbÞ

^ that minimizes QðbÞ.
The Method of Simulated
Moments
estimator is the vector b
 
 
^ and Vmz b
^ be the two (row-vector) gradients evaluated at the estimate,
Now let Vmy b
and write U ¼ Syz 5I240 , where Syz is the varianceecovariance matrix of the data ðy; zÞ#.
Finally
 
^
 
^ ¼ wT Vmy b
v b
^
Vmz b

�1

wT Uw

 
^
Vmy b
 
^
Vmz b

�1

T

w

gives the varianceecovariance matrix of the Method of Simulated Moments estimator.
Here is how I did the non-linear estimation. I followed the procedure in Judge et al. (1982,
chapter 24). The ﬁrst step is to minimize the sum of squared errors between the model’s pre
dictions and the data; I used the data at all four horizons because the model has predictions for
each horizon, given the inﬂation history. The second step is to evaluate the gradient
Vf ðxt ; bÞ ¼ ðvf ðxt ; bÞ=vb0 ; .; vf ðxt ; bÞ=vb4 Þ at the estimated coefﬁcients and each of the
240 data points. The inner product of the resulting 240 � 5 matrix gives the varianceecovariance matrix of the estimated parameters. Because this is a model of Bayesian learning, the error
terms in this model are not independent across time, nor are they independent across the different horizons at which foreign exchange is traded forwarded. So the third step corrected
the standard errors from the non-linear least squares estimates using the NeweyeWest
(1987) correction. The last step is to test the hypothesis that there is no heterogeneity of prior
beliefs in  these data.
  It is natural to use a Wald test based upon the statistic
^ , where
^ 0 RVR0 �1 Rb
W ¼ Rb
Rb ¼

0 1 �1 0 0
0
b¼
0 0 0
1 �1
0

captures the two linear restrictions stating that the precisions of beliefs about American inﬂa
tion are identical and so are the precisions having to do with German inﬂation. The variancee
 0   �1
 0   �1
 
^ Vf x; b
^ � G½Vf x; b
^ Vf x; b
^ � , where Vf x; b
^ is the
covariance matrix V ¼ ½Vf x; b
‘‘stacked’’ 240 � 5 gradient evaluated at the estimates and
 the data and G is the Neweye
^ and the data at various lags.
West correction, constructed from correlations between Vf x; b
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